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 Marxism and Patronal Theory 
Daniel G. Weber 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper will be to assess Henry Hale’s Patronal Theory, and analyze it 
from a Marxist perspective.  Patronalism has emerged as the most cogent framework within 
comparative politics to analyze the post-soviet space. Therefore an assessment of this framework 
from larger paradigmatic programs is necessary.  With Marxism as the paradigmatic focus of this 
paper, dialectical materialism will necessarily serve as the epistemological foundation of this 
analysis.  The methodological process of dialectical materialism will be supplemented by 
ontological categories established by important Marxist theorists. 
 Patronal politics, as described by Hale is defined as, 
 ...politics in societies where individuals organize their political and economic pursuits 
primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments 
through chains of actual acquaintance, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal 
principles such as ideological belief or categorizations… ​(Hale 10) 
But what is the Marxian assessment and analysis of the patronal model?  As an analytic 
framework which traditionally views the capitalist state as necessarily the dictatorship of the 
bourgeoisie (in its simplest and succinct formulation), is Hale’s framework compatible? 
Furthermore, as a paradigm which prioritizes material considerations and conditions, can 
patronalism be compatible within a Marxist framework of analysis. 
Analyzing ​Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective 
from a Marxian perspective will require an investigation of Hale’s book by section.  The logic of 
expectation, Hale’s exposition of patronalism in this region’s history, constitutions and their role 
within patronal societies, networks, power pyramids, and revolutions will be analyzed with the 
analytical scope revolving around the Marxist method. 
 
Patronalism 
Hale explains how patronalism distributes power in given states through “roughly 
hierarchical networks through which resources are distributed and coercion applied.” ​(Hale 10)​. 
This approach to studying the post-soviet space has opened the door to a more sufficient analysis 
of this region’s politics.  When compared to the traditional theoretical models of 
institutionalization and democratization, patronal theory provides a superior model for analysts 
in this field of study. 
Hale demonstrates these patterns through exploring a multitude of social spheres where 
patron-client relationships dominate, and mafia-like networks run the show from the scenes of a 
formal state sphere.  State processes in this region cannot be analyzed through regular 
institutions and political parties.  Rather, informal social networks make decisions in accordance 
to a specific structure which revolves around extended patronal pyramids. 
In the post-soviet space, actual power is acquired and utilized by means of favors 
which clients carry out for patrons, and completion of material acquisition for patrons in 
exchange for some payout or another by the patron.  If a business-owner, for instance, helps a 
patron in securing electoral victory, will more than likely acquire themselves favorable 
contracts with the state.  
Each country in the post-soviet space has a pyramid structure of its own extending 
from the top (patron-in-chief, which is usually the literal head of state), down to sub-patrons 
(who are usually oligarchs, or directors of state institutions), down to lower levels of the 
political world, all the way down to the private and personal lives of citizens.  Yes, 
patronalism extends to the daily lives of working-class people who are sure to play the game, 
lest they be reprimanded by a highly corrupt business and legal sector. 
As far as a Marxist analysis of this brief overview is concerned, patronal theory can 
thus far be classified as compatible and commensurate with a hypothetical Marxist analysis of 
these states.  A Marxian analysis would likely recognize and explore the factors which gave 
rise to this unique form of social organization in this part of the world (likely exploring the 
period of hyper-capitalism in the 1990s, superstructural conditions, and so on).  Additionally, 
a Marxist analysis would stress the need to explore the class dynamic in patronalism.  While 
Hale certainly looks at the development of oligarchies, a Marxist might indeed center their 
analysis around the oligarchs and how they use this informal system to maintain ideological 
and material power. 
Logic of Expectation 
Henry Hale begins explaining patronalism by describing its fundamentally 
informal nature.  For Hale, the informality embeds corruption and forms the basis of a social 
equilibrium where, “Given that everyone expects everyone else to behave this way, it makes no 
sense for an individual to behave differently since she would only wind up hurting herself and 
possibly those who depend on her, possibly severely.”​ (Hale 20).  
For patronal societies this happens specifically in vertical hierarchical pyramids of power 
consisting of patrons and clients.  The distinction is made clear however between patronalism 
and patrimonialism or neopatrimonialism.  This is because patronalism is not a concept about 
rule or domination, but about social equilibrium.  That is to say while patrimonialism and 
neopatrimonialism describe a type of rule, patronalism broadly describes social relations and 
patterns thereof. 
This clearly is something to be filed under the category of the superstructure for the 
Marxist analyst.  The inherently sociological nature of the patronal framework certainly appears 
to be capable of maintaining compatibility with the Marxist program.  That is, so long as social 
relations as defined by patronal theory can be understood as emerging from a material basis.  If 
this is so, the Marxist is content. 
Before laying bare the genesis of patronal social relations, Hale describes how patronal 
patterns emerged in hunter-gatherer social formations.  The Marxist ontological framework 
refers to this formation as primitive communism, and would agree with Hale’s assessment 
insofar as Hale states the primacy of personal relationships within this prehistoric social 
formation.  Most Marxists however would likely consider Hale’s statement that, “Patronalism is 
in fact the norm throughout all recorded human history…”​ (Hale 28) ​as utterly ahistorical and 
false.  Henry Hale describes patronalism as a sort of default mode for social organization, which 
traps humans into a social equilibrium which is less optimal than a formal arrangement. 
While personalized networks were absolute in primitive communism, and even important 
in almost every social formation, this is not what patronalism is.  By definition, patronalism is 
rigidly hierarchical, and by Marxian definition, primitive communism is relatively egalitarian. 
Furthermore, for the Marxist, humans are not by nature patronalistic.  They create patronal 
circumstances as a result of material conditions.  As Frederick Engels put in ​Origins of the 
Family, Private Property, and the State​, “According to the materialistic conception, the 
determining factor in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of the 
immediate essentials of life.” (Engels) 
Therefore the dialectical materialist would almost certainly reject Hale’s implication that 
patronalism is the natural state of human society, and that it is the default social outcome.  The 
degree to which this problem is relevant will be further examined, but instead of getting caught 
in the quagmire of anthropological discourse and discourse on human nature, we will turn to 
Hale’s description of what binds patronal networks. 
For this, Hale cites three factors emphasized in classical studies: 
(1) The patron’s continued access to valuable resources for rewarding loyal clients (2) the 
patron’s power of enforcement, his ability selectively to deliver punishments to the 
disloyal…(3) the patron’s capacity to monitor clients and “subpatrons,” those figures who 
have clients of their own but who also are themselves the clients of more powerful be 
patrons. ​(Hale 31) 
These reasons can possibly work within the Marxist paradigm, but lack the obvious unit of 
analysis in Marxist literature: class.  These reasons seem to explain what keep a specific patron 
or another in power, but do not seem to address what underlies the networks of patronal social 
relations.  When class enters the picture, it can be deduced perhaps that a patron exists to 
safeguard class privilege, and for this reason, subpatrons endorse a given patron.  What would 
bind patrons, subpatrons and clients would have to be analyzed as a intertwined series of 
interrelationships with material considerations emerging as primary in the last instance. 
Then Hale mentions the literature on ideology and how ethnic and other bonds have been 
said to bind patronal networks.  Hale discredits this view pretty quickly stating that there are very 
many case-studies which show ideology to be irrelevant in patronal organization.  Additionally, 
ideology for Hale necessarily leads back to a focus on organization and resources.  
A de-emphasis on ideology would certainly seem to be compatible with a Marxian 
outlook, which is typically allergic to idealist justifications of social phenomena.  
Hale then goes on to focus on organization and resources which seem to be surfacing 
over and over again.  This is a problem in his model as he explains that low-resource societies 
can still maintain patronal systems.  Additionally, the problem of organization for Hale is one 
which recognizes that these organizations are made up of clients  who carry out the rewarding 
and punishing and monitoring.  The tautology of patrons securing loyalty of clients when clients 
loyally carry out the will of patrons is resolved through the logic of expectation. 
Within the logic of expectation, clients obey patrons when they expect other clients to be 
obeying patrons.  In analyzing this as a Marxist, there should not be a distinction between the 
logic of expectation and ideology.  Hale of course uses ideology in the mainstream sense of the 
word, which a Marxist might understand as a worldview.  Ideology however for a Marxist is a 
much broader concept which can be understood as consciousness conditioned through 
socialization within the superstructure to maintain an economic base.  With this in mind, the 
logic of expectation can be seen as the unspoken ideological glue, binding patronal organization 
which binds socioeconomic class, which then binds a given mode of production.  
When placing the logic of expectation within the Marxian category of ideology, Hale’s 
explanation serves as a compatible description of patronal affairs within a Marxian analysis. 
Hale’s analogy of the ‘bank-run’ has the corollary in the Marxist canon of ideological crisis, 
where prevailing ideas and beliefs are shattered, thus leading to a social transformation.   As 
capitalism, “...has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural 
superiors” ​(Marx)​, a bank-run likewise tears asunder the ties a depositor has with their bank. 
It is also within the context of expectation that exploitation takes place.  Clients know 
that fundamentally they are being taken advantage of by their patrons.  Labor, within patronal 
organization, which consists of rewarding, punishing, and monitoring on behalf of a patron, is 
used to maintain class society which is necessarily exploitative economically.  But it is also 
exploitative in that clients are stripped of their free will and made to live in fear of what other 
clients may do to them on behalf of their mutual patron.  Instead of controlling the patronal 
system, the patronal system controls people, including patrons who must act in accordance to 
patronal laws of motion beyond their control.  While it is true that social structures control 
people in all class societies, patronal systems uniquely control humans in a particularly vicious 
way. 
Constitutions 
“For individuals in highly patronalistic societies, what matters most for one’s material 
welfare is belonging to a coalition that has access to - and hence can pay out - resources.” (Hale 
61).  From the materialist vantage point, this section starts off splendidly.  This of course 
however is a reiteration of the fundamentals of patronal logic.  As for the rest of the chapter, a 
traditional Marxist analysis can be tricky task. 
Henry Hale elucidates a fundamentally structural hypothesis which resembles what 
Marxist literature refers to as ​form analysis​.  The primary hypothesis of form analysis is that 
political development occurs parallel to the changing functional needs of capitalist societies. 
This is not to say that Hale in any way adopts this hypothesis, but rather, an amended form which 
can then become compatible with a Marxist structural form analysis. 
To explain, a basic understanding of Hale’s analysis is necessary.  Put simply, three 
primary constitutional models exist in the post-soviet space; presidential, semi-presidential, and 
parliamentary.  Each come about by means of certain conditions, and each are the primary causes 
of different political changes. 
 
Constitution Typical Pyramid Pyramid Formation 
Presidential Single-Pyramid Hybrid or Rigid 
Semi-Presidential Competing Pyramids Hybrid or Loose 
Parliamentary Single or Competing 
Pyramids 
Loose 
 
The presidential system is highly compatible with an authoritarian political system in 
many countries, and the post-soviet space is no exception.  The post-soviet space however 
combines the patronal dynamic to establish highly informal and authoritarian systems.  In the 
presidential system, the president almost always serves as patron-in-chief, and keeps tight control 
of society through subpatrons who dominate state or private monopolies, and state officials and 
bureaucrats who operate the intelligence services, law enforcement, military, and justice system. 
Because of the president’s constitutionally privileged access to state-power, presidential systems 
tend to lean authoritarian, and rigid.  Furthermore, except under the condition that the president 
is an unpopular lame-duck (which predictably triggers a political disjunction structurally), the 
president is frequently capable of maintaining one single patronal pyramid throughout the entire 
society. 
The semi-presidential system on the other hand tends to reflect a compromised division 
of power.  In the post-soviet space this has been caused by territorial considerations (see Hale’s 
exposition of Tajikistan), a facade used to manipulate patronal patterns of development (see 
Hale’s exposition of Putin’s power-play with Medvedev), or whenever a parity of power exists 
between two patrons-in-chief that cannot be resolved otherwise except by means of a bloody 
civil war (see Ukraine).  In the semi-presidential system, power is shared between a President 
and Prime Minister.  Often, these each represent patrons-in-chief of competing patronal 
pyramids.  It should also be noted that semi-presidential systems are introduced to provide the 
illusion of formal weakening of executive power.  This of course is an illusion because real 
power in the post-soviet space is executed through informal networks.  Regardless, changes in 
formal institutions can trigger changes in informal networks as expectations can change and so 
on. 
The parliamentary system distributes power more loosely in contradistinction to 
constitutional systems with a strong executive branch, and this inevitably correlates to looser 
patronal pyramids.  While Prime Ministers still typically function as patrons-in-chief, they 
operate at the behest of a parliament which acquires a greater level of autonomy and influence. 
Because Prime Ministers can be more easily replaced than Presidents, the logic of expectation is 
altered, and consequently a looser pyramid formation emerges. 
Using form analysis, a Marxist consider constitutional changes in light of changing 
socioeconomic conditions.  An empirical research program might try to look at possible 
correlations between capital concentration and rigid pyramid formation.  Furthermore, uneven 
development which is a noted Marxian prediction of capitalist development, can lead to 
emerging centers of power which might in fact be concurrent with semi-presidential systems. 
While Hale’s analysis of patronal structure is compatible with a structural marxist 
methodology, an instrumental marxist might also find some use value within the contexts of 
different constitutions.  An instrumentalist might analyze how different constitutional modalities 
generate alternative state-systems which are then more or less conducive to strengthening and 
maintaining economic power and control.  However, instrumental marxism is definitely an 
actor-centric model, and therefore patronal theory which leans towards a structural analysis will 
find more compatibility with structural marxism. 
Networks 
Patronal theory claims that informal networks form informal institutions which are served 
by formal institutions rather than vice versa. A Marxian analysis should not necessarily take any 
particular problem or note with this, unless one was interested in a deep thoroughgoing 
sociological analysis.  In terms of political Marxian analysis however, this is all fine and good, 
so long as the class component and element of class dictatorship are recognized.  So does Henry 
Hale do this in ​Patronal Politics​? 
Hale actually makes a point compatible with a Marxist analysis by stressing the role of 
oligarchs.​  ​Hale explains how patronal networks emerged from the power of oligarchs and of 
state officials.  Oligarchic power is totally consistent with Marxian theory, and so is personalistic 
power derived from state authority.  This blending and blurring of state and economic lines 
actually forms the basis of the theory of State Monopoly Capitalism, which emerged from Lenin 
to describe, an environment where the state intervenes in the economy to protect larger 
monopolistic or oligopolistic businesses from threats. ​(Lenin) 
State Monopoly Capitalist theory in the Marxist canon states that it is inevitable for 
governments and monopoly capitalists to fuse and utilize mutual resources for maintaining 
power.  This seems to have occurred within the post-soviet sphere very clearly, and Hale even 
does an excellent job of tracking the development of this process in this region. 
Hale explains how opportunistic people in the Soviet Union took advantage of the market 
reforms.  The market reforms of the late 1980s brought on the emergence of a new class of 
people determined to overthrow the Soviet social order.  When they succeeded in dismantling 
socialism, a period of hypercapitalism emerged which proceeded to enrich the few at the expense 
of the great masses. 
State enterprises were sold off at a fraction of their value, as neoliberal economists helped 
to guide the transition to capitalism.  This lead to not only relative immiseration (wages 
developing a negative relationship to overall economic value creation in the whole economy) but 
also to absolute immiseration, as Marx stated in​ ​Capital​. 
The inordinate surplus-value extracted from the working class then implies a mass 
accumulation of surplus-value by the capitalist class.  This process was extraordinarily 
pernicious in the post-soviet space. 
This process of mass wealth accumulation then developed an obvious relationship with 
political power, as guarantors of oligarchic power, ie state officials could work within or develop 
their own patronal networks.  Conversely, oligarchs could translate their economic power into 
material advantages into networks of clients.  The base-superstructure dialectic therefore takes 
motion where a predominately informal culture shapes a context for patronal network formation, 
and economic power fuels and drives this process in the last instance.  As Althusser stated in 
Contradiction and Overdetermination​, “[the sum of individual wills and variegated variables] 
r​eally embodies determination by ​the economy in the last instance​.” (Althusser) 
Meaning that while a variety of factors influence events, the economic variable is primary, and 
so determines events in the last instance.  Hale’s emphasis on oligarchs, and the state officials 
who enabled them is completely compatible with this view. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ensuing chaos and confusion on 
expectations lead to a period of extreme flux.  For Henry Hale, patronal networks took time to 
adjust, before consolidating into systems which encapsulated the entire states they existed within. 
Leaders and respective clients needed to learn how to navigate the new terrain, with the most 
capable patrons prevailing by means of natural selection (reminiscent of evolution, a theory 
lauded by Marx and Engels as a validation of dialectical materialist philosophy). 
This section of ​Patronal Politics​ discusses the tendency for single-pyramid structures to 
develop in the 1990s.  From well-intentioned liberal democracies, to privatizers, to elite 
fragmentation, to divided societies, to civil wars and state failure, to resource poor states, to 
quasi-states, and so on.  In each case, single-pyramids developed almost universally. 
Focus on and emphasis on the use of state violence to consolidate political power, 
hierarchical oligarchic influence, and consolidation emerging from crisis are all compatible with 
a Marxist outlook, but there are a few ways to take an analysis of this phenomena further through 
the paradigm of Marxism. 
 As Bukharin states in ​Imperialism and World Economy,​ “Finance capital seizes the 
entire country in an iron grip. "National economy" turns into one gigantic combined trust whose 
partners are the financial groups and the s​tate.” (Bukharin).  From this perspec​tive, the state 
monopoly capitalism thesis can be explored further.  The troubles of the 1990s, which gave way 
for the hypercapitalism and extreme concentration and centralization of wealth which translated 
into political power.  The pool of potential contenders for state power got smaller and smaller as 
economic power narrowed.  From there, oligarchs mostly had to develop their own class 
consciousness and resolve their own competing interests to establish strong states to maintain the 
new order.  
Marx elaborates his theory (see Capital vol. 3 sec. 3 chapter 15) of the necessary 
concentration and centralization of capital (which have proven true thus far in modern capitalist 
societies).  Interestingly, in the post-soviet space this did not happen as a protracted result of 
market competition.  This happened in one sweeping period of a few years, and the effects of this 
on society were immense.  Just as it was immense on its political system. 
The brief period of wild west style capitalism after the fall of socialism immediately 
developed into state monopoly capitalism, and Eurasian states were mobilized to protect these 
interests, and expand them internationally.  
Revolutions 
Henry Hale was absolutely correct to downplay the nature of the Color Revolutions. 
While many analysts praised these events as democratic breakthroughs, someone with 
knowledge of patronal politics would have scoffed.  A Marxist who is willing to go out of the 
conventional comfort zone of orthodoxy, might notice a resemblance between Debord’s Society 
of the Spectacle theory, and the color revolutions.  “The spectacle is a social relation between 
people that is mediated by an accumulation of images that serve to alienate us from a genuinely 
lived life. The image is thus an historical mutation of the form of commodity 
fetis​hism.”(Debord).  This p​assage from ​Society of the Spectacle​ displays how these Color 
Revolutions were a spectacle.  They gave the popular masses the opportunity to feel as if they 
were taking part in a social transformation.  But these were not revolutions.  These were facades 
which coincided with the expected logic and rhythm of regime cycles. 
So why is it that these Color Revolutions were merely spectacles, and not capable of 
changing the real political life of post-soviet society?  For the Marxist, the answer is simple. 
These weren’t revolutions in the first place.  In the Marxist paradigm, a revolution is an event by 
which one class overthrows another and assumes political power.  From this vantage point, 
calling the Color Revolutions, revolutions simply isn’t cogent.  With not emphasis on class 
power, or economic relations, nothing of importance is going to change. 
Additionally, while violence is not necessarily a universal component of revolutions, it is 
almost always necessary.  These Color Revolutions exiled some leaders perhaps, but the 
informal networks remained, and no threat of violence or force against them took place.  
If a capitalist social order already exists, and a populace clamors for more liberality, a 
revolution doesn’t make sense.  To create the conditions for greater liberal rights, and bourgeois 
development, the economic prerequisites should exist first, which means that a prominent middle 
class, or labor aristocracy should exist. 
The labor aristocracy consist of a contingency of the working class loyal to bourgeois 
de​velopment.  While they may seek greater privileges, and political representation, they seek in 
no​ way to disrupt the capitalist mode of production (see Lenin’s ​Preliminary Draft Theses On 
The Agrarian Question For the Second Congress of the Communist International​) 
It’s precisely this group that is capable of expanding bourgeois right.  However, the post-soviet 
space does not yet have a group like this in large enough quantity.  
While the color revolutions don’t constitute proper revolutions in the Marxian sense, 
there are interesting similarities with how Hale and how Marx assess the development of 
revolution.  In each case, there is a structural development which occurs in stages. 
Within patronal theory, patronal networks undergo crisis as the result of the logic of bank 
runs.  As described earlier, bank-runs are ruptures of disjuncture where informal networks are 
torn asunder.  It could be argued that populations undergo a consciousness of themselves and of 
patronal oppression.  Because of course citizens of these societies are already familiar with the 
conditions of patronal society, this would mean ideology more in the sense of how Zizek 
interprets non-ideology as ideological so long as people still act in accordance to its inscribed 
behaviors/practices/rituals. 
The corollary in Marxist theory would be emergence of class-consciousness which leads 
to the decisive break with the logic of capital. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since Marx and Engels, Marxists have developed deep relationships with non-Marxian 
theories to understand them within the Marxist worldview.  In anthropology, history, sociology, 
political science, and so on, mainstream interpretations of things have been assessed and 
analyzed within the Marxist canon to help increase its body of knowledge.  This for Marxists is a 
dialectical process of intermingling with other ideas, as well as a scientific process in which 
theories have an objective basis to be assessed critically.  In this sense, it is my view that patronal 
theory as developed by Henry Hale could be reimagined within a Marxist context and used to 
help build upon the Marxist political science.  
The reimagining process is vital, so as to not establish a theoretically incommensurable 
perspective which does neither the Marxist, nor the patronal theorist any justice.  On these 
grounds, patronal theory must be understood in the following ways to be compatible with 
Marxism. 
First, patronalism absolutely cannot be considered ahistorically as a universal human 
phenomena.  A Marxist cannot reasonably interpret patronalism in this way.  Therefore, if a 
Marxist wishes to refer to patronal theory, it should be done almost exclusively in the context of 
contemporary politics.  If one wishes to apply the lessons of patronal theory to Soviet history, 
one must be really careful to understand the economic base, and careful to understand the deep 
interrelationships, structures, and systems which existed within the previous political context. 
Second, an analysis of the current post-soviet economies and their relationship to the 
political systems is vital for a Marxist theorist.  A robust understanding of world systems, 
imperialism, and how the average rate of profit across these economies is influencing political 
behavior is essential. 
Third, any Marxist theorist will have to make sure they are conforming patronal theory to 
a developed state theory.  Instrumentalism, Structuralism, Derivationism, Systems-Analytic, 
Organizational-Realism, and the Strategic-Relational Approach all encompass dominant theories 
in this field.  In fact, patronal theory would likely help explore hypotheses in different Marxist 
state theories to provide empirical evidence for and against the different theoretical models. 
Fourth, a Marxist should not get fooled by the discourse of ‘revolutions’ as it exists in 
mainstream literature.  Fortunately, Hale explains how these ‘revolutions’ reproduce patronal 
logic, which works for us, but it is our role to explain why this happens on a deeper level. 
With these considerations in play,how can a Marxist use patronal theory?  First, the 
dialectical method requires a diagnosis of contradictions.  A research program dedicated to that 
could be thoroughly robust, but some examples of contradictions to be analyzed and explored are 
the contradictions between formal and informal structures, between patrons and clients, between 
post-soviet states and western states, and so on. 
Second, the material basis of patronal logic should be uncovered.  Profit rates are crucial 
to this, as it is the allocation and distribution of profits which maintain social reproduction. 
Additionally, the effects of the relative immiseration of working class wages in proportion to 
economic development are highly important to look at.  This is largely because this process is 
precisely preventing the development of a labor aristocracy, and therefore the backbone of a 
more liberal society. 
Third, any Marxist thinker must recognize their role within the context of class struggle, 
and not assume to be removed like an objective and neutral third party.  Marxists tend to 
embrace their role as the intellectual vanguard of working class struggle, and seek truth in order 
to change the way things are. For a Marxist, Patronal politics should be thoroughly understood in 
order to dismantle patronal systems in this region and establish a new social order based on 
working class liberation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
